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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
by Justice West, in the case of Scott v. Gillespie,2 8 "The rule that,
when a will once gives a fee simple title, a subsequent contradictory
provision must fail, is not sufficient in these days, when from the words
used such rule would go counter -to the intention of the testator."
Under this doctrine it is apparent that the words of inheritance, while
they purport to pass an absolute fee, do not of themselves determine
the status of -the estate that the devisee is to take, as this is an issue
which, under the general rule, must be derived from the whole will and
all of its parts taken together.
J. Frederick Meister.
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In

the recent case of In re United Cigar Stores Co. of America, 8 F. Supp. 243 (D.
C. S. D. N. Y. 1934), the court held that where the buyer, who had entered
into a requirements contract to buy .for ten years all the ice cream required for
the buyer's stores, ceased doing business as a result of bankruptcy, the buyer
had performed its contract so that the seller had no provable claim in bankruptcy for damages for breach of contract' against the trustee in bankruptcy.
This case raises the question as to the extent of the duty of the buyer in a
"requirements" contract. May he relieve himself of responsibility by going bankrupt, by selling his business, by materially curtailing his use of the product, by
substituting some other product, or by ceasing operation of his business altogether until such time as it becomes again profitable for him to take advantage
of his contract with the seller? The authorities are divided on all these questions,
except that there seems to be no case in which it"is held that the buyer is liable
in damages for breach of contract on ceasing to do business because of a bona fide
financial inability to maintain his business as a going concern.
If the buyer completely abandons the business the general tendency has been
to hold him liable. See Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., 35 Fed.
(2d) 117 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), where the buyer sold his factory, for whose requirements he had contracted for five years. Contra: Drake v. Vorse, 52 Iowa
417, 3 N. W. 465 (1879), which held that the buyer could discontinue his
business at any time, without being subject to liability to the seller.
The theory of such cases generally centers about the language of the
contract. Several methods of construction are used in order to hold the buyer
liable. It has been held that under the contract the buyer has agreed, impliedly
at least, to continue to use his normal requirements of the article contracted
for during the period stipulated for in the contract. Loudenback Fertilizer Co.
v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., 121 Fed. 298 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903); Chatmer &
Williams v. Bledsoe & Co., 218 Ill. App. 363 (1920). It has been held that the
buyer must purchase all that he in good faith requires. Cragin Products Co.
v. Fitch, 6 Fed. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); McKeever, Cook & Co. V.
Cannonsburg Iron Co., 137 Pa. St. 606, 20 AUt. 938 (1890). It has been held,
28

103 Kan. 745, 176 Pac. 133 (1919).
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also, that there is an implied promise to remain in the business. Diamond Alkali
Co. v.P. C. Tomson & Co., supra; Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 611, 615, 82
N. W. 241, 49 L. R. A. 594, 81 Am. St. Rep. 227 (1900); Great Lakes & St.
Lawrence Transport Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., 239 Fed. 603 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917).
The case of Wells v. Alexandre, 130 N. Y. 642, 29 N. E. 142, 15 L. R. A. 218
(1891), is frequently cited to sustain the proposition that the buyer must take
all the goods that his business, if maintained under substantially the same conditions as existed at the time the bargain was made, would require.The defendant,
in this case, accepted the offer of the plaintiff to furnish three special steamers
with coal for the yar 1888. In the middle of the year the defendant sold the
steamers to another company. It was, nevertheless held liable for failure to
purchase coal. The court said: "The fact that the defendants deemed it best to
sell the steamers cannot be permitted to operate to relieve them from the obligation to take the coal which the ordinary and accustomed use of the steamers
require." This case, however, represented an exceptional form of contract, which
really involved the purchase and sale of coal, the amount of which was to be
measured by the requirements of certain steamers rather than by the requirements
of the purchasers. The steamers continued to require coal, and the amount required
was held to fix the amount the defendant agreed to buy, even though they no
longer owned the steamers.
In Great Lakes & St. Lawrence Transport Co. v. Scranton Coal Co., supra,
the plaintiff obtained an injunction to prevent the defendant from selling its
vessels. The defendant had contracted to haul the plaintiffs coal for three years.
The court held that the defendant must continue in business during the term, and
run its boats in a reasonable manner continuously.
If the buyer makes changes in his business, or has substituted other articles
for those covered by the contract, the issue should be settled by determining
whether the contract caused the change or whether it was brought about by a
technical improvement that would have been made in any event.
The plaintiff, in Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co., supra,
entered into a contract whereby it was to buy its entire consumption of phosphate
rock for use in making fertilizers from the defendant at a fixed price and the
defendant agreed to supply the same as ordered. The plaintiff was to be allowed
to order as much as 3,000 tons yearly and the agreement was to run five years.
It was understood that the plaintiff normally used about 1,500 tons yearly. For
more than a year, during the term of the contract, the plaintiff bought no phosphate rock but bought acid phosphate from other manufacturers instead, because
it could make the fertilizer cheaper by using the acid instead of the rock. At the
end of the year, the price of the rock having materially increased, the plaintiff ordered the maximum of 3,000 tons. The court held that the plaintiff, by substituting acid phosphate for the rock previously used and contracted for, solely
because it was more profitable, had substantially breached the contract, and so
could not recover inbreach of contract from the defendant when he failed to
deliver the rock according to the terms of the contract.
In another case where the defendant had contracted to buy all the coal used
by it from the plaintiff, the defendant using "slack" coal in its plant, the court
held that the plaintiff could not substitute "nut" coal from another company
solely because it was cheaper than the contract price of "slack" coal. McKeever,
Cook & Co. v. Cannonsburg Iron Co., supra. However, a buyer was not held
for failing to keep up his purchases of alcohol when he was prevented from using
it by government order. The buyer had agreed to buy all the alcohol used in
its plant, approximately 1,800 barrels for the next year, from the plaintiff. The
buyer used only 568 barrels of alcohol during the year because the government
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withdrew the permit for its use of alcohol. The plaintiff sued the buyer claiming
the buyer had bought 1,800 barrels, and so was liable for breach of contract for
failing to take the whole amount. The court, however, held that the defendant
had not bought 1,800 barrels but only the amount it needed during the year and
so had complied with the contract. Cragin Products Co. v. Fitch, supra. In the
case of Cannonsburg Iron Co. v. McKeever, 138 Pa. St. 184, 16 At. 97 (1888),
it was held that where the defendants had agreed to purchase from the plaintiffs as much as they should require for their mill, the defendants were not liable
for failing to purchase as much coal as originally contemplated because of having
substituted natural gas for fuel. The court said: "What coal was necessary for
consumption in their works they must take from the plaintiffs. This was all
they were bound to do, and all the plaintiffs were bound to furnish them; and
it is of no consequence whether the falling off in that consumption was occasioned
by the contraction of their business, or by the introduction of gas. In either
case less coal was necessary for 'the defendants' manufactory, and they were not
obliged to pay for what they did not require."
Charles M. Pieroni.

INSURANCE- INDEMN=IY INsURANCE.-The plaintiff, having already been awarded a judgment for $7,500 in the case of Merrill v. Beckwith, 61 Fed. (2d)
912 (C. C. A. Sth, 1932), under a survival statute, and not having been
paid, now directly sues the decedent's insurance company on a policy of automobile liability indemnity insurance held by the decedent. The insurance company
defends on the grounds, first, that the policy was to cover losses actually sustained
by the decedent, not his liabilities; and, second, that the policy was issued solely
for the benefit of the insured, and therefore a third party had no right to maintain an action on it. Held, that the plaintiff could recover. Ohio Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Beckwith, 74 Fed. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. Stb, 1935). The court said that the
distinction between that type of insurance policy which insures against liability
and that which insures against losses is to be found in the intention of the parties
as disclosed in the contract. If the intention is that the insured is to be protected against actual losses it has become the custom to insert within the policy
a clause providing that no action shall lie against the insurer "unless it shall be
brought by the assured himself, to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and
paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after a trial of the issue." Whereas, a
policy which does not contain this "no action" clause, but insures against loss
imposed upon the assured by law, and, also, jontains provisions to the effect
that the assured will immediately notify the insurer of any injury to persons,
or damage to property, covered by it, and will not settle any claim growing out
of such injury or damage without the consent of the insurer, that the insurer
will defend in the name of and on behalf of the assured any suit brought against
the latter to enforce ank such claim, is, the court maintained, a policy of insurance against liability. The court cites numerous cases to uphold the distinction
it makes. Malley v. American Indemnity Corporation, 297 Pa. St. 216, 146 At.
571 (1929); Schambs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 259 Fed. 55 (1919); American
Indemnity Co. v. Fellbaum, 114 Tex. 127, 263 S. W. 908 (1924).
Since the policy in the principal .case was in accord with the last description,
it was held to be a policy of indemnity against liability rather than loss. However,
it is worthy of note that decisions on this question are far from being uniform.
See Note, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184.
The second defense involves a point of much more importance. As the court
says, it relates to a phase of law which has not been decided in any reported
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case to be found in careful search. This phase of law is whether an injured party
may directly sue the insurer of his tort-feasor on a contract of liability insurance
between the tort-feasor and the insurer? Professor Vance substantiates the contention of the court that this point has never been decided. He says: "In the
absence of statute the injured person acquires no rights whatsoever under a
liability policy insuring the tort-feasor, unless the policy makes express provision
for payment to such injured person, or by -reasonable construction of the policy
provisions an intent to benefit the injured party can be inferred." VANcF ON IrsunsiwcE (2nd ed.) 682. Apparently the furthest the courts have gone to favor
the injured party is to allow him the right togarnishee the insurance company.
Patterson v. Adan, 119 Minn. 308, 138 N. W. 281 (1912). However, Vance says
that this rule "has been accepted in a few jurisdictions, but is opposed to the
overwhelming weight of authority." VANCE oN INsURANc- (2nd ed.) 685.
It is more than interesting, then, to examine the reasoning whereby the court
created this precedent. The first step in the process was that there was nothing
said in the contract as to who had the right to bring suit against the insurer for
the amount of the judgment against the insured, although the contract admitted
the insurer's liability for that amount. In other words, there was no "no action"
clause in the contract, and thus nothing therein which would specifically prevent
the injured party from bringing suit for the amount of the unpaid judgment.
This point made, the court went on to say: "The conclusion is inescapable, as
it seems to us, that appellant's policy confers a benefit upon an injured person
who recovers a judgment against the assured in an action for damages coming
within its provisions. If appellant had agreed to pay a debt which assured owed
to appellee, the latter would have had a clear right to enforce the contract.
There "is no difference in principle in the obligation assumed by the policy." (The
italics are mine.)
Thus it will be seen that the court justifies its holding on the basis of a third
party creditor beneficiary arrangement. In support of its decision the court cites
Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49 (1892), stating the decision of that
case to be that "Where a contract creates a right or imposes a duty in favor of a
third person, the law presumes that the parties intended to confer a benefit on
him and furnishes him a remedy." Upon closer examination of that case it is
doubtful that it is quite as much in line with the present decision as the court
construes it to be.. It actually reads as follows: "It [the contract] must have
been entered into for his beenfit, or at least, such benefit must be the direct
result of performance, and so within the contemplation of the parties. ..
In further support of its decision the court cites Byram Lumber Co. v. Page,
109 Conn. 256, 146 Atl. 293 (1929), stating the decision of the latter case to
be that the law will furnish the injured party a remedy even though the primary
purposes of the parties to the contract was to benefit themselves only. And,
finally, the court cites the case of Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N. J. Law 75, 38
Atl. 802 (1897), to support its contention that the third party need not be known
or know of the contract at the time it is entered into. The case of Levy v.
Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., Inc., 108 Conn., 333, 143 At 163 (1928).,
would seem more in point to support the present case. There a statute included
a third party beneficiary contract in every contract concerned with the renting
of an automobile from any auto-renting company in the state in favor of whomever might be injured by such automobile. It is analogous because in that case
also the beneficiary was unknown to the contracting parties; and because the
primairy purpose of those parties was to benefit themselves alone, the law presumed that the parties wished to benefit an unknown beneficiary and furnished
him with a remedy.
In the final consideration of the cogency and value of the present decision it
is helpful to refer to a somewhat prophetic article by Professor Herbert D. Laube

